Back to the public? Assessing Public Broadcasting in the Netherlands by Bardoel, J.L.H.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/63072
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
BACK TO THE PUBLIC?
ASSESSING PUBLIC
BROADCASTING IN THE
NETHERLANDS JO BARDOEL
Abstract
New responsibility and accountability mechanisms
for public broadcasters (PSBI, such as the broadcast
assesmentrecently introduced in the Netherlands, are
meant to modernize the relationship between public
broadcasters and their audiences. These new ways of
organizing public broadcasting's social responsibility
are a response to recent trends in broadcast policies -
e.g. the advent of dual broadcast systems and there-
fore stricter legitimation needs and competition rules
for PSBs - as well as more general trends in society-
e.g. the end of stable ideologies, individualization
processes and the emergence of more self-conscious
citizens. Consequently the mission statements of public
broadcasters have become much more explicit in
recent years, and the same holds for the ways in which
they accept public obligations and report about their
performance in public. The tradition of political respon-
sibility, based on explicit law and regulation but in
practice often a tango of political and broadcasting
elites, is now being supplemented by new forms of
public accountability in which PSBs try to establish a
more direct feedback with the public. The article, finally,
looks at the present broadcast assessment process in
the Netherlands. Based on both research evidence and
personal experience of the author, questions are raised
such as' how does it work, what are the first experi-
ences and does it seem to be a viable model for other
countries? Despite risks of politicization and bureaucra-
tization, public broadcast assessments promise to offer
a useful new instrument for both internal quality control
and external legitimation.
Jo Bardoel is researcher at
the Amsterdam School of
Communications Research
(ASCOR) and Professor of
Media Policy at University
of Nijmegen, e-mail:
j.l.h.bardoel@uva.nl.
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Broadcasting in the Netherlands arose out of citizens' initiatives in civil society
and was then inserted into the dominant compartmentalized socia-political sys-
tem of Ilpillarization." This implied a hierarchical power structure but also strong
involvement from the rank and file. From the 1960s, partially under the influence
of internal competition between the separate public broadcasting organisations
and the rise of market research in broadcasting, the citizen was treated more as a
mere media consumer whose attention was fought over. Consequently, broadcast-
ers largely lost their significance as member based associations. In the 1990s, after
the arrival of the dual system, II public" broadcasters were once again forced to
worry and make a claim about their raison d'etre, and they decided upon a double
accountability structure, for separate public broadcasters and for public broadcast-
ing as a whole. In this article we will look at both the tradition and the new prac-
tices of public broadcasters' accountability in the Netherlands.
A "Pillarized" System
Looking in the rear-view mirror, the Netherlands neither chose for a national
broadcasting system ala the BBC, as in most other European countries, nor for a
commercial broadcasting structure as in the United States or Luxembourg, but for
its own solution, commonly characterised as "pillarization" (Lijphart 1975). In this
system, broadcasting was not left to the state or the market, but to social move-
ments that had already established their own organisations in most domains of
social life, like politics, education, health care, culture and leisure. The broadcast-
ing organisations "Within these 'I pillars" were not only non-commercial but also,
confusingly, private associations. So, public broadcasting in the Netherlands was
born out of social movement initiatives, organised privately. The radio spectrum
was divided equally over the principal social groupings that operated autonomously
and were financially self-supporting, thanks to an active and supportive member-
ship. Therefore, contrary to other countries, civic participation and involvement
with radio and later television has a long tradition. The broadcasting time allotted
to the associations was based on the size of their membership and, to a great ex-
tent, they were free to fill this time as they chose. With interlocking directorships
and ideological or religious feelings, the corporations were clearly part of the "pil-
lar" of their own social movement. Consequently, broadcasting did not have a le-
gitimacy problem in the first decades of its existence.
After the war, the radio corporations, and soon television too, while busy
professionalizing themselves, increasingly distanced themselves from their grass-
roots supporters. Under the slogan of breaking the barriers of religious and socio-
political divisions, the latter began to adopt a more relaxed attitude with regard to
their own organisations and to increasingly choose from the whole range of broad-
cast material rather than from the programmes offered by their own organisation.
This mutual process of disengagement between the broadcasting company and
the public was further reinforced by the arrival of television. The "old public or-
der" of broadcasting had difficulty grasping the public's new preferences and tastes
which manifested itself in a new, more internationally-oriented youth culture, that
was better understood and catered for by foreign or 'Ioffshore" commercial chan-
nels like Radio Luxembourg, and later TV-Noordzee and Radio Veronica. The Broad-
casting Act of 1967 allowed TROS to enter the playing field as the legal variant of
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ew
 Y
or
k U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:5
5 2
4 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
the "pirate" broadcasting station TV-Noordzee in the mid 1960s. As a result, fierce
competition over viewer support (popularization" which came to be known as
"TROSsification") developed when the newcomer TROSintroduced a more Ameri-
can-style, leisurely programming.
This new style of broadcasting no longer focused on citizens but on consumers.
Programmes and programming were increasingly tailored to preferences learned
from market research, and the influence of democratic associations more and more
became a thing of the past. In addition, the emphasis began to shift from internal
competition between broadcasting corporations to external competition with for-
eign, increasingly commercial entrants. Ultimately, it became inevitable to allow
for commercial broadcasting in the Dutch language, primarily as a result of Euro-
pean regulation (the Directive "Television without Frontiers"). It led to the current
IIdual system" in which the battle for viewers and listeners has taken on entirely
new dimensions.
The rise and fall of the Dutch broadcast model thus is the result of sociological
trends in society as well as structural changes in the broadcasting context. We see
that bureaucratization of organisations and professionalisation of journalists gradu-
ally replaced active participation of citizens, a trend that is further reinforced in
the last ten years since public broadcasting felt itself forced to co-operate and cen-
tralise in response to commercial competition. All the attempts in the past decades
to reactivate citizens to participate more actively in broadcasting associations have
failed, not only due to professional and organisational resistance but also because
of the circumstance that people nowadays seem less easily motivated to partici-
pate actively in public organisations on a collectivist and permanent basis. New
entrants into the public broadcasting system are less organised on the basis of a
distinct political or religious identity and more often on a (post)modern consumer-
ist lifestyle. As a reaction to this ongoing trend of decreasing traditional participa-
tion and representation, public broadcasting is now beginning to develop new
strategies of showing responsibility or being accountable to the public, compara-
ble to what other, national broadcasting institutions as the BBC are practising
(Bardoel and Frissen 1999, 206).
Restructuring Public Broadcasting within a European
Context
After the introduction in 1989 of a dual broadcasting structure in the Nether-
lands, as the result of the European Directive 'ITelevision without Frontiers/' the
Dutch government had to restructure and Ilreinvent" its broadcasting policy in the
1990s. In a first response, commercial broadcasting via cable was legalised. But
Dutch politics had to redefine its position vis-a-vis public broadcasting for the long
term as well. The government appointed a high level commission which advised-
in its report "Back to the Public" (Commissie-Ververs 1996) - to renew the social
embedding of the broadcasting associations by introducing broadcasting elections
as a new mechanism to allocate broadcasting time. This proposal was widely criti-
cised because it was assumed not to cure but to worsen the disease, by increasing
IIconsumerism" or II quasi-commercialization" of the relation between broadcast-
ing associations and their members. There was more appreciation though for the
commission's fundamental reassessment of the mission of public broadcasting as a
M
00
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
ew
 Y
or
k U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
3:5
5 2
4 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
u
.-
-.a
i
I
~
provider of comprehensive, reliable, attractive and innovative programmes which
function as a point of reference in an ever more complex and rapidly changing
information society. The government did not follow the proposal for broadcast
elections, but strongly supported the proposed mission statement. It also supported
a new, more centralised management structure, including a single concession for
public broadcasting as a whole, instead of many separate licences for broadcasting
associations, which might revitalise the ailing public broadcasting system.
The Concession Act of 2000 represents a next step in the transformation process
of public broadcastingr from a specific, national tradition towards a new European
future. The memorandum to the act refers to "pluriformity" as the heritage of the
Dutch broadcasting tradition and to the importance of stimulating national cul-
ture, but also to a new role public broadcasting should play, as a forum in a
multicultural information society for which support from the young and from mi-
grants is essential. Public broadcasting must guarantee pluralism, quality and dis-
tinctive programming. The tension between quality and reaching a large audience
is considered inherent with public broadcasting, and should stimulate broadcast-
ers to look for a link between high and low culture. Public broadcasting should
therefore be active on both old and new platforms, such as the Internet. So-called
Iisecondary" tasks like Internet services and thematic channels should be financed
from the regular budget. Special programmes (or thematic channels) may be
charged a little extra, but plain pay-TV is not allowed for public broadcasters.
Under the new act, concession holders are no longer separate associations, but
it will be public broadcasting as a whole - represented by the Netherlands Public
Broadcasting (NPB; the new name for that part of NOS that serves as the umbrella
organisation for public broadcasting). Membership no longer decides the number
of hours of broadcasting time per association. More important than membership
becomes the question to what extent public broadcasters perform according to the
conditions assigned by the Concession Act or to the self-assigned duties in policy
plans. Every five years there will be an independent audit or assessment to check
if the organisation's performance is in accordance with the promises laid down in
the policy plan at the beginning of the concession period. All in all, Dutch broad-
casting is in the process of moving from a decentralised system on the basis of
broadcasting associations to a more centralised, BBC-like public broadcastingstruc-
ture.
The conclusion seems clear. Dutch broadcasting had a tradition of civic partici-
pation with a system that represented a third way between market freedom and
state control, and that relied heavily on people's involvement. The old, pillarized
society of collectives, in which stable group patterns determined living and work-
ing of people, has, however, been replaced by a (post)modern, dynamic society of
individuals, in which people individually and eclectically decide how to live their
own lives. Television and radio play once again a crucial role in the formation of a
general "media culture" (Dahlgren 1991, 17), in which mass media have become-
more than political parties, churches or labour unions - the most important plat-
forms for the formation and exchange of opinions and tastes. At the same time,
people are increasingly difficult to organise on the basis of active representation
and therefore this system is being replaced by a different, relatively "light touch"
model of media responsibility and accountability.
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Four Mechanisms of Accountability
The issue of social responsibility and accountability of (public) broadcast media
has raised considerable interest since the advent of commercial broadcasting and
as a result the introduction of dual and competitive broadcasting systems in most
European countries. At the core of the "old" system of public accountability were
II politicians and broadcasters, to some extent each checking and balancing the other"
(Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem 1992,229). According to Sondergaard (1996,24) "com-
petition has above all forced public service media to be more responsive to the
audiences than previously in the sense that viewers' and listeners' wishes and de-
sires now carry more weight than society's desires regarding cultural or social func-
tions. The dissolution of the monopolies meant the death of the kind of paternal-
ism previously associated with public service media."
Both Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem (1992) and Blumler and Mitchell (1994) sug-
gest that there is a need for a new model and for new mechanisms of social respon-
sibility, not only because of the Iinew TV-regime" in Europel but also because of a
new relationship between individuals and social institutions in general. The latter
refers to a broad pattern of changing social conditions such as a higher level of
education and of expectations among citizensl the breakdown of traditionally au-
thoritative institutions, an increased geographical, social and physical mobility, the
decline in moral certitude, the blurring of traditional boundaries of taste and other
post-modern conditions. All these trends and needs cannot be adequately tackled
by the traditional dominant accountability mechanisms like the market or the state.
New and extended accountability mechanisms arel according to these and other
authorsl also an important democratic imperative II given the formative conse-
quences of broadcasting for popular leisure, the fabric of culture and the quality of
public life."
The very concepts of responsibility and accountability imply a relationship be-
tween broadcast media and those affected by them within society. In practice there
are different procedures, lines or frames of accountability for (public) broadcast-
ers. Lange and Woldt (1995, 467) state that the realisation of social responsibility of
television results from the interaction of several factors: (1) constitutions and laws;
(2) supervision and control (licensing, etc.); (3) condition of the TV market, and (4)
journalistic responsibility and self-regulation. In the same vein, McQuail (2000,
183-187) comes up with four accountability frames: (1) law and regulation; (2) the
market; (3) public responsibility, and (4) professional responsibility. Both classifica-
tions share the following four mechanisms (BardoeI2oo1; Bardoel and d'Haenens
2003):
1. political accountability;
2. market accountability;
3. public accountability;
4. professional accountability.
The political accountability system was - and indeed still is - dominant in public
broadcasting. It comprises the legal framework for regulating the structure and
functioning of broadcasting. At the same time this responsibility mechanism has
its flaws, both for principal and practical reasons. In the words of Blumler and
Mitchell (1994, 230), "the dominant political accountability mode lacks clean hands.
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The root of the problem is that politicians have vested interests in television pro-
grammes that are potentially at odds with the civic interests of viewers." Practical
problems are, as McQuail (2000, 185) has pointed out, that formal regulation is
easier to apply to structure than to content, that it is often ineffective, hard to en-
force, unpredictable in its wider and long-term effects and finally inflexible and
hard to change.
Market accountability is in Europe only rarely considered an adequate mecha-
nism of social responsibility. The system of demand, supply and competition of-
fers a good and simple indication of consumer tastes, as McQuail (2000, 185) rightly
states. And, he adds, in the market mechanism there is no compulsion involved. At
the same time, this model tends to favour majority preferences over quality of
content or critical and minority voices. For public broadcasters this model may
function as a useful antidote against the traditionaliisupply side" paternalism and,
internally, as a stimulus towards more efficient behaviour. For them this mecha-
nism is especially relevant in that advertising is a substantial source of income and
thus Ilmarket shares/' or in fact Ilaudience shares/' become an important param-
eter. In a competitive environment the pressure on public broadcasters to produce
an attractive UmfeIt for advertising will increase. Next to this external IIcommer-
cialisation/' the new competition also evokes an internal drive towards more effi-
ciency and a quasi Ilinternal market" (d. BBC's Ilproducers choice")1 that some con-
sider as yet another indicator of commercialization.
In the Dutch broadcasting situation, with private organisations within a public
system, both the cultural and the commercial logic co-existed already for a long
time. This mixed traditionl with many organisationsl internal competition and
plenty of room for advertising possibly explains why Dutch public broadcasting-
better than national broadcasters in neighbouring countries like Belgium and Ger-
many - seems able to cope with commercial competition.
The professional accountability frame does relate less to the "vertical" and formal
structuring of media organisations and more to the II horizontal" and often infor-
mal identification of media professionals with the standards of their own profes-
sion. Professional responsibility refers to the performance criteria and ethical codes
of media professionals that often are supposed to complement tOI or better: com-
pensate for, the political or market dependency of the media organisation. The
development of professional responsibility and indeed of professionalisation of
media occupations is in past decades often seen as a progressive force vis-a-vis the
traditional influences of the political or the market system.
According to McQuail (2000, 187) this professional framework is likely to work
because it is voluntarYI self-regulatorYI non-coercive and in the self-interest of me-
dia and professionals. But it has in his view also serious limitationsl since profes-
sionalism is in most cases not strongly developed within the media and as a result
media professionals have Ilrelatively little autonomy" from media management
and ownership. The same holds for mechanisms of professional accountability
within Dutch public broadcasting organizations. Since these associations are pub-
lic and have a structure of democratic representation they consider explicit provi-
sions that safeguard professional responsibility and accountability as obsolete. For
that reason public broadcasters did not hasten to comply with a new article in the
Media Act of 1988, which obliged them to have a "programme statute" that regu-
lates editorial freedom and independence.
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Finally, public accountability has gained considerable popularity over the last
decade. Although the concept and the very name of"public broadcasting" already
suggest a strong emphasis on public responsibility, the reality was and is that pub-
lic broadcasters rely heavily on their (exclusive) relationship with politics. "It would
be a mistake," Blumler and Mitchell (1994: 221) write, "to assume that the public broad-
casters have a well-developed system of accountability to their viewers. They have
mainly been accountable for their goals, standards, programmes and expenditure
through agencies of their political system." The overall conclusion of their inquiry
is, indeed, that accountability to viewers has been marginalised and that it has so
far not been a central concept in the governance of European broadcasting systems.
In trying to define"public responsibility" McQuail (2000, 186-187) indicates that
most open societies display, aside from the general public opinion, a "Wide variety
of pressure groups and lobbies that seek to look after the interest of one or other
groups in society. Taken together, these many voluntary action groups are part of
the informal IImechanisms" by which media are constrained to meet certain stand-
ards of performance in society. Next to this feedback mechanisms with informal
but still collectively organised institutions, also the relationship with the audience
becomes an ever more important part of public responsibility. With individualiza-
tion being a formidable social trend, public broadcasters can no longer rely on their
relationship with formal and informal groups and collectivities; they have to es-
tablish a relationship "With individual, Ilunorganised" citizens. We see in fact that
public broadcasters address their viewers and listeners more and more directly,
through special broadcasts, public hearings or other more or less interactive con-
sultation mechanisms. On the other hand more conscious citizens hold media ac-
countable for their performance by a process of naming, blaming and claiming
(Pritchard 2000). The problem with this kind of accountability procedures, how-
ever, is that they are voluntary most of the time; it is often hard to see the differ-
ence between real feedback procedures and ritual PR strategies.
Shifting Social Responsibility for Public Broadcasters
Since the mid 1980s the self-evidence of public broadcaster's legitimation has
been challenged by both changing political beliefs and the introduction of com-
mercial television in Western Europe. Public broadcasters suddenly found them-
selves operating in a market where also commercial stations offered their services.
To counter claims of unfair competition, public broadcasters had to show more
'Idistinctiveness" vis-a-vis commercial competitors. ''As this distinction erodes, ei-
ther through more light touch regulation for public broadcasters or while commer-
cial broadcasters will show more quality, substance, cultural performance or plu-
ralism, the power of the legitimation for public broadcasting will weaken and ED
law will impose more severe restrictions on public broadcasters/' warned a Dutch
high level government commission in 1992 CCommissie-Donner"; Donner et al.
1992). In this new, competitive media environment in Europe, public broadcasters
started to rethink and often rediscover their role in and social responsibility to
society. Since then we notice a gradual shift from political accountability to new,
public accountability mechanisms.
On the basis of a content analysis of policy documents of the public broadcast-
ing organizations in the Netherlands over a period of 40 years Bardoel and Brants
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(2003) have traced how they have (re)defined their role in relation to the public
and the public interest. Looking at the changes from the old public order (1960-
1980), the transition period (1980-1990) and the new dual order (1990-2000), they
show the ways in which public broadcasters come to terms with the more market
oriented attitudes of subsequent governments and how they II translate" new regu-
latory frameworks in their own programme policies. They had already demon-
strated that the overall awareness of social responsibility in the broadcasting poli-
cies of subsequent Dutch governments had increased over time (Bardoet Brants
and Plug 2000). This reflects both the increasing (discursive) struggle over public
broadcasting in a dual and competitive system and the more critical stance of citi-
zens and society towards the performance of social institutions and organisations
in general. Emphasising more the cultural tasks is a reaction to the influx of cross-
border television, the need to reposition public broadcasting vis-a-vis commercial
broadcasting and, last but not least, a changing social composition of society. In a
sense, it seems that in broadcast policies the old, modernist paradigm - with free-
dom and equality as the core values- is being replaced by a more postmodernist
approach. There is more room for individual cultures, styles, and tastes and less
for paternalistic policies, at least in the rhetoric. Our impression was that the
specificities of Dutch broadcasting policies and their traditional legitimation erode
and are being replaced by more common, perhaps '/European" policy motives.
The analysis of the policy documents of the public broadcasters showed a
stronger emphasis on public responsibility, on program content requirements and
on the cultural tasks of public broadcasters, and particularly more attention to mi-
norities of all kinds. References to the institutional requirements and arrangements
that organized the external pluralism of the "pillarised" public broadcasting sys-
tem in the Netherlands decreased in the same period in both governmental and
broadcasting documents. For the broadcasters it is another indication of a shift
from an internal to an external orientation of public broadcasters, and more atten-
tion for media performance in terms of content or output. It seems they are eager
to follow the policy trends. Policy legitimation seems to do the same: from an im-
plicit, via a more ritualistic to a mere strategic function for policy. This trend is also
reflected in the format and content of the policy documents over time, from purely
reactive vis-a-vis government policies in the old order period to much more pro-
active approach at present. On the basis of this, a more specific periodisation of the
characteristics of social responsibility in governmental and broadcasting organiza-
tions' policy can now be sketched (see Table 1).
Table 1: Periodisa1ion of Social Responsibili1y in Broadcas1ing Policy
Old public order Transition period New dual order
1960-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
Government policy emphasis Organisation Organisation Organisation/Role for society
Broadcasters policy Organisation Organisation/Role Content/Role for
emphasis for society society
Policy legitimacy Implicit Ritualistic Strategic
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New Accountability Mechanisms In Dutch Public
Broadcasting
The second half of the 1990s is characterized by a more fundamental considera-
tion of the future responsibilities and legitimacy of public broadcasting. A left-lib-
eral government appointed an independent committee whose task it was to give
advice on the future of public broadcasting (Commissie-Ververs 1996). In retro-
spect/ we can see that few of the committee's practical suggestions (such as Ilbroad_
casting elections") have been put into practice, but the basic conceptualization of
the significance of public broadcasting in the information society has remained.
Also based on the committee's work, the new Concession Act of 2000 repre-
sents a
paradigm shift in the perspective of the government's broadcasting policy.
The main question is no longer that of who has the "right" to broadcasting
time based upon membership figures and representativeness. The main
question now is what Dutch society as a whole can expect. A broadcasting
corperation's achieved and prospective accomplishments determine whether
it will receive more broadcasting time (Van der Haak 2001, 13).
Prior to the new act, the NOS had published the memorandum Publiek in de
toekomst (Public in the Future 1998), with different suggestions for new forms of
"accountability." It proposed that there be a "double legitimacy" - for separate
broadcasting associations and for public broadcasting as a whole - and a II double
strategy" - to seek more contact with the public and to be formally scrutinized on
its public function. In order to realize this, the memorandum presented a number
of suggestions, the most far-reaching (following the example of higher education)
being an external assessment committee periodically evaluating the extent to which
public broadcasting is fulfilling its societal role. This was subsequently taken up in
the Concession Act (art. 30c). In addition, public broadcasting promised to con-
tinually seek new ways of keeping in touch with society, through annual reports,
debates with the public and the"creation of a television programme with an inde-
pendent and mediatory character" (NOS 1998, 10).
This'going out' to the public and being seen to be accessible and accountable
was formally laid down in the Concessiebeleidsplan 2000-2010 (Strategic Plan for the
Licensing Period 2000-2010; NOS 2000). Next to already existing financial and pro-
gramme (quota) instruments, the plan proposed a number of newl/public account-
ability" measures (Bardoel and d'Haenens 2002; Van Dijck 2003):
1. Accessible information:
• annual report, by programme, with balance sheet and adjustments;
• annual booklet for the general public (hard copy and electronically);
• newsletters for target groups;
2. Public dialogue:
• meetings "With special interest and other organisations and target groups;
• enabling content-related group visits;
• television-mediator programme on internal operations and public reactions;
• use of the Internet for debates, publications and Ilmeta-programmes";
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3. Assessment of goals:
• a version of the financial annual report for the public;
• an assessment committee judging performance and making recommendations;
• every five years, recognition of existing broadcasters and possible admission of
new broadcasters that II essentially improve the broadcasting system."
Some of these intentions are already in place (such as the annual programming
report and the organisation of meetings with experts and target groups), others
are still to be installed (including the mediator programme and content-related
group visits). The assessment commission and periodic recognition, now statu-
tory, is also being carried out. In addition, individual broadcasters must also dem-
onstrate that their members II can influence policy in a verifiable and democratic
manner" (NOS 2000, 11). Consequently, several broadcasting associations make
considerable efforts in revitalizing and modernizing their relationship with their
respective memberships.
A New Performance Indicator: Assessment
Commissions
The Concession Act, as the newest version of the Media Act, obliges the Nether-
lands Public Broadcasting (NPB) to organise every five years an evaluation of the
public broadcasters' performance. To this end, it must install an external assess-
ment commission consisting of at least five independent experts, 'las much as pos-
sible" representative for the viewing and listening audience. The commission is
selected by the NPB Management Board and appointed by the Board of Gover-
nors after consultation with the minister responsible for media. The final report
will be presented to the Board of Governors which will eventually publish the
report. The first responsibility thus lies with the broadcasters themselves, not the
government.
The Commission must, according to the new Media Act, report on the perform-
ance of both national public broadcasting as a whole and of the separate broad-
casters. It must assess to what extent the programmes offered meet the '/interests
and insights" of the general public and of specific social and age groups in Dutch
society. Article 30 leaves it to the commission to come up with recommendations
on the future goals or mission of national public broadcasting and the way these
should be implemented.
This periodical assessment procedure is meant to strengthen the legitimacy of
public broadcasting. But it is also seen as an instrument to monitor if existing broad-
casting organisations still contribute to the"dynamic plurality" of public broad-
casting and that new social groupings have access to the open public broadcasting
structure the Netherlands are known for. Consequently the minister for Culture
will use the results of this assessment for the procedure renewing the licence of
separate broadcasting organisations every five years, as part of the ten-year licence
period for public broadcasting as a whole. The minister can use these results either
(not) to renew the '/recognition" of a broadcaster or to change the conditions under
which they get a new one.
The first assessment commission, consisting of 9 members, started in January
2003 and will report before May 1, 2004. The difficult combination of requirements
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has led to a commission that is in fact relatively young, fairly representative in
terms of gender (apart from the chairman half of the members are women) and of
ethnic background, and with no prevailing political affiliations or relations with
vested broadcasting institutions. The chairman is a member of the Management
Board of ING Bank who has had a career in both business and academia and is
affiliated to a small left-liberal party. In its working procedures the commission
closely follows the model that has proved to be practicable in higher education.
Although the law does not require this, the Board of Governors of NPB has de-
cided that broadcast organisations must first produce a so-called '/self-assessment/,
in which all broadcasting organisations separately report on and evaluate their
performance in the current concession period in relation to the plans and prom-
ises made in their strategic policy documents. In order to make these self-assess-
ments comprehensive and comparative between organisations, the Board of Gov-
ernors has designed a detailed '/assessment framework" that touches upon the
most relevant aspects of broadcasters performance, asking what are:
1. the programme perspective: mission and identity, performance, cooperation;
2. the audience perspective: reach, segmentation, distinctiveness, accountability;
3. the organisational perspective: structure and culture, financial transparency and
efficiency, innovation.
The selection of these perspectives and the questionnaire are an adaptation of
the protocol that is being used in higher education, and addresses the cultural,
normative as well as financial performance criteria.
First experiences indicate that broadcasters find this self-assessment useful but
difficult. They are traditionally used to defining their mission and goals in mainly
qualitative and not measurable criteria and language, which makes it thus hard to
evaluate one's performance in concrete and conceivable terms afterwards. Since
these self-assessments present partly confidential information and organisations
are invited to be self-critical, the documents will not be published. The assesment
commission has started its work by reviewing the self-assessment documents of
all broadcasting organisations and has continued with interviewing the manage-
ment of the respective broadcasting organisations. In the first phase, the commis-
sion assesses the performance of separate broadcasting organisations that together
make up the system. In the next stage it will look at the performance of public
broadcasting in total, assessing the extent to which this represents the 'I dynamic
pluralism" of (post)modern Dutch society.
Positive Signs
Although the new assessment procedure is very fresh and very much '/workin
progress/' it is possible to give a first evaluation. Drawing on the experience in
higher education and from two earlier, self-organised pilots with the new system
in public broadcasting - the author was a member of these pilot commissions and
is that of the present first official commission - one can conclude that this assess-
ment procedure can become a viable instrument for both external accountability
and internal quality control. The independence of the commission can give its as-
sessments high credibility and this mechanism may therefore help to"depoliticise"
the relationship between politics and public broadcasting. It thus counterbalances
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the possible effects of the recent replacement of the licence fee with taxation as the
main source of revenue for public broadcasting, which was said to run the risk of
too close a tango between politics and broadcasting. Public broadcasters for their
part take the procedure seriously, since they know that their reputation and their
"recognition" as public broadcaster may depend on it. The final assessment will be
made public and may attract - as similar assessments in higher education learn - a
lot of public and press attention. At the same time the analogy with higher educa-
tion learns that these assessments are first and foremost meant as an incentive to
stimulate organisations to critically reflect on and improve their performance, and
not to terminate their existence - although this may be the ultimate step.
The self-assessment document proves to be a good start for the auditing proce-
dure/ since it stimulates the organisation to show some self-reflection and intro-
spection and serves at the same time as a solid base for the work of the commis-
sion. Public broadcasting organisations were used to produce more or less politi-
cally correct policy documents on request, but there was no practise to regularly
evaluate promises and performances. Broadcasting organisations that have experi-
mented already with assessment procedures tend to come up with different, more
measurable and concrete promises to meet for the next plan period. A certain stand-
ardization of these self-assessment documents is also a necessary precondition,
since otherwise it is hard to compare the performance of the respective organisa-
tions.
At this early stage not much can be said about the work of the assessment com-
mission itself. But drawing upon my own experience in hvo pilot commissions, I
can say that of course the chairperson and the secretariat are crucial positions. The
commission can only produce an authoritative report if it reaches consensus; to
this end a competent chairperson and an open-minded, non-partisan commission
with mutual trust and without hidden agendas are indispensable.
Critical Notes
All in all the assessment committee has the potential to become a valuable new
policy toot but there are also considerable risks involved. The main risks are
politicization, bureaucratization and ritualisation. In some countries or cultures
broadcasting is politicised to an extent that an independent commission is almost
an illusion (though the same holds true for the very concept of independent pub-
lic broadcasting as such). Moreover, a political system that continually comes up
with new policy measures while the commission is still at work, puts pressure on
its independence. The commission is then dealing most of the time with a moving
target. Two new Dutch government coalitions within one year and critique on its
performance in dealing with the phenomenon of the killed populist politician
Fortuyn, have resulted in serious cuts in the budget of public broadcasting. In prin-
ciple it were preferable if a government waits with important policy or financial
measures until a concession or licensing period is over; it allows broadcasters
enough time to perform according to their promises and it allows politics to act
less on a haphazard basis.
As to bureaucratisation, the (self-)assessment procedure involves a lot of paper
work, which might become a system and an end in itself. Moreover, it might be-
come an additional system of control for (internal) managers and (external) super-
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visors that in fact serves as a straightjacket for the professional and creative peo-
ple. On the other hand, professional broadcasters all too easily think that any kind
of accountability mechanism threatens their independence, quality and creativity.
Media professionals traditionally are primarily oriented towards their product and
much less towards the public and their role in and for society. A feasible middle
way has to be found between freedom and responsibility for public broadcasters.
Ritualisation is a risk in the same vein. Public accountability in general, and this
assessment procedure in particular, may become another element in the perma-
nent rhetorical and paper discourse between public broadcasting organisations
and their political supervisors. In this discursive struggle it is never quite clear to
what extent the paper reality represents and has a close relation to the '/real" real-
ity. In this context it is important that the assessment procedure remains, as origi-
nally intended, a mechanism for public accountability and not of political account-
ability. The specific mechanism was initially proposed by public broadcasters them-
selves in order to establish a new and closer relationship to citizens and civil soci-
ety, and to gain independence from both the political system and commercial pres-
sures. By putting this proposal into law, its status was certainly strengthened, but
the risk of being"colonised" by the political system becomes more serious. At the
same time, the mere fact that the commission was initially installed by and will
finally report to the Board of Governors of Netherlands Public Broadcasting means
that it still is an instrument of self-regulation and of public accountability.
Conclusion
Direct access of social movements to radio and television and a public broad-
casting system based on separate associations with ideologically or religiously or-
ganised members has created in the Netherlands a diversity of content and an
involvement of citizens hardly known anywhere else in the world. At the same
time we see that sociological developments and changes in the broadcasting con-
text have outdated the system and called for structural reform. These changes only
came slowly and incrementally, and it was finally not national politics but '/Brus-
sels" that paved the way for a dual broadcasting system. "Public accountability"
has been dominant during the old order of pillarized public broadcasting. The ero-
sion of the pillar system allowed for more autonomy of the professionals and re-
sulted in both political and professional accountability. Moreover, the Broadcast-
ing Act of 1969 had also introduced a quasi-commercial competition, and thus a
kind of market accountability. This mechanism became even stronger in the 1980s
when a combination of stagnatingincome and increasing programme output made
more efficiency imperative. Recently, with dual competitive broadcasting putting
pressure on the legitimacy of and political commitment for the public structure,
we notice a renewed interest for public responsibility. However, it is no longer
embedded in a national tradition of emancipating the audiences and supporters of
separate pillars, but in a new, more European perception of public broadcasting.
New accountability mechanisms for public broadcasting as a whole have been cre-
ated along with an assessment procedure, which is conditional for holding or ob-
taining a licence.
Although vague and sometimes disputed, social responsibility and account-
ability are still pretentious notions. Their actuality coincides with important social
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trends: the shift in policy approach from looking at organisational structure to
emphasising informational and cultural performance; the emergence of a more
conscious, critical and even cynical citizen; and the emphasis on IIgood govern-
ance" as an important trend within government and the business community. The
public has gradually evolved into a media consumer, a process both witnessed and
strengthened by audience research. A greater involvement of citizens in media
matters may offer an answer to these issues.
The new mechanisms of public accountability in the Netherlands look promis-
ing. The newly introduced periodical assessment procedure by way of an inde-
pendent commission, as part of the licence renewal process, can become a valu-
able instrument for external accountability and internal quality control. It may also
serve to depoliticise the relationship between politics and public broadcasting, es-
pecially since the licence fee has been replaced by taxation. It remains, however, to
be seen whether this new instrument can overcome the inherent risks of
politic:ization and bureaucratization and whether the outcome becomes part of
symbolic politics or will be indeed symptomatic for a new and "listening" public
broadcasting system.
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